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OPINION OF THE COURT
__________
RENDELL, Circuit Judge.
S&S Services, Inc. appeals from an order entered in the District Court on January
23, 2002, denying its motions for a new trial and for judgment as a matter of law following
a jury trial in August of 2001.  We will affirm.
As we write solely for the parties, we will repeat the facts only very briefly.  In early
1991, S&S principal Siewdath Sookram agreed to sell to Laurenceteen Rogers a parcel of
land that S&S was developing in St. Thomas.  A written contract was executed, and Rogers
made a down payment for the property in the amount of $100,000, but soon thereafter a
dispute broke out between the parties.  In July of 1991, S&S filed suit against Rogers
essentially claiming that she had taken wrongful possession of the parcel, and Rogers, in
turn, filed a number of counterclaims relating to alleged defects in S&S’s construction on
the property.
The case proceeded to trial ten years later, and in August of 2001 a Virgin Islands
jury found that Rogers was not liable to S&S but that S&S had breached its contract with
Rogers, and ultimately returned a verdict in Rogers’s favor in the amount of $200,000.  On
    1 S&S also argues that the District Court should have granted its motion for summary
judgment on certain of Rogers’s counterclaims.  Because the case proceeded to trial,
however, our review is relevantly limited to the District Court’s denial of S&S’s Rule 50
motion.  See Hopp v. City of Pittsburgh, 194 F.3d 434, 439 n.3 (3d Cir. 1999); see also,
e.g., Baughman v. Cooper-Jarrett, Inc., 530 F.2d 529, 532-33 (3d Cir. 1976) (holding that a
motion denying summary judgment will not be reviewed on appeal from a jury verdict
where sufficient evidence supports the jury’s verdict), overruled on other grounds by
Croker v. Boeing Co., 662 F.2d 975 (3d Cir. 1981); Wright, Miller & Cooper, Federal
Practice and Procedure § 3914.28 (“If an erroneous denial of summary judgment is
followed by trial . . . the denial should not be reversed if sufficient evidence was introduced
at trial.”).
    2 Neither party addresses the jurisdiction of the trial court.  In its decision dated January
14, 1999, the District Court suggested that it was exercising federal diversity jurisdiction,
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332.  We note, however, that there is no conclusive indication in
the record that these parties are in fact diverse.  Nevertheless, it appears that the District
Court had original jurisdiction over this action as essentially a territorial court of the
3
September 12, 2001, S&S filed a motion for judgment as a matter of law pursuant to Fed.
R. Civ. P. 50(b), with regard to both its claims and Rogers’s counterclaims, as well as an
alternative motion seeking a new trial pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 59.  In January of 2002,
the District Court denied those motions, holding that they were both untimely filed and
moreover that the Rule 50(b) motion was waived because S&S had not provided any
evidence that it had previously made a motion pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 50(a).  This timely
appeal followed.
S&S presents three issues on appeal:  (1) whether the District Court erred in
dismissing S&S’s post-trial motions as untimely and waived; (2) whether it is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law under Rule 50; and (3) if it is not entitled to judgment as a
matter of law, whether it is entitled to a new trial pursuant to Rule 59.1  We have
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.2
Virgin Islands, because the suit was filed in June of 1991, before the October 1, 1991,
amendment to the Virgin Islands Code that divested the court of that jurisdiction.  See 4 V.I.
Code Ann. § 76; Newfound Mgt. Corp. v. Lewis, 131 F.3d 108, 119 n.9 (3d Cir. 1997)
(stating that the District Court of the Virgin Islands generally retains original jurisdiction
over actions filed before October 1, 1991).
    3 Had the District Court been correct that S&S’s motions were not timely filed, we would
have been without jurisdiction.  See Fed. R. Civ. P. 4 (requiring the filing of a Notice of
Appeal within thirty days of the entry of judgment, but tolling requirement for the timely
filing of certain post-judgment motions).
    4 S&S apparently did, however, waive its argument with regard to Rogers’s generalized
breach of contract counterclaim seeking general damages – including, as S&S conceded,
the $100,000 Rogers paid as a down payment on the parcel.
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We note initially that the District Court was mistaken in refusing to reach the merits
of S&S’s post-trial motions because it viewed them as untimely.  Even Rogers concedes
that S&S’s motions were in fact timely filed.  The District Court’s order of judgment was
filed August 31, 2001.  Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(a), S&S had until September 17, 2001
to file its post-judgment motions, and timely filed them on September 12, 2001.3  The
District Court’s determination that S&S’s Rule 50(b) motion was waived was similarly in
error, as S&S in fact properly made a Rule 50(a) motion both in favor of its claims and
against Rogers’s counterclaims.4
Notwithstanding the District Court’s procedural errors, the record before us is such
that we can address the merits and we see no reason to disturb the jury’s verdict.  We
consider first S&S’s claim for judgment as a matter of law under Rule 50(b), over which
our review is plenary.  See, e.g., Warren v. Reading School District, 278 F.3d 163, 168 (3d
Cir. 2002); Trabal v. Wells Fargo Armored Service Corp., 269 F.3d 243, 249 (3d Cir.
52001).  Accordingly, we apply the same standard as the District Court, examining whether
when “viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmovant and giving it the
advantage of every fair and reasonable inference, there is insufficient evidence from which
a jury reasonably could find liability.”  Warren, 278 F.3d at 168 (quoting Fultz v. Dunn, 165
F.3d 215, 218 (3d Cir. 1998)).  Reversal is only appropriate where “the record is critically
deficient of that minimum quantity of evidence from which a jury might reasonably afford
relief.”  Trabal, 269 F.3d at 249 (quoting Powell v. J.T. Posey Co., 766 F.2d 131, 133-34
(3d Cir. 1985); see also Hopp v. City of Pittsburgh, 194 F.3d 434, 439 (3d Cir. 1999)
(same).  Because sufficiency of the evidence is a purely legal question and our review,
accordingly, is de novo, it is appropriate to reach the merits even though we are without the
benefit of a district court opinion.
S&S argues that there was insufficient evidence to support either the jury’s verdict
against S&S on their claim of intentional deprivation or the jury’s verdict in favor of
Rogers on her breach of contract counterclaim.  We do not agree.  With regard to S&S’s
claim, the evidence introduced at trial could support the conclusion that Rogers’s actions,
while certainly self-interested, did not constitute an intentional deprivation of S&S’s
property interest under Restatement (Second) of Torts § 871.  We reach a similar
conclusion with regard to the jury’s verdict in favor of Rogers on her counterclaim.  The
actual existence of a contract was well supported by the evidence presented at trial, and,
viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Rogers, the jury could reasonably have
found that S&S’s inadequate performance was in breach of that contract.  Finally, there was
    5 Typically we would not reach the merits of a Rule 59 motion where the District Court
has not previously considered them.  See Interstate Commerce Comm’n v. Carpenter, 648
F.2d 919, 921 (3d Cir. 1981) (per curiam); see also Olefins Trading, Inc. v. Han Yang Chem
Corp., 9 F.3d 282, 290 (3d Cir. 1993); United States v. Contents of Accounts Nos.
3034504504 and 144-07143 at Merrill, Lynch, Pierce, Fenner and Smith, Inc., 971 F.2d
974, 988 (3d Cir. 1992).  We do so here only because S&S’s claims are wholly without
legal merit.
6
sufficient evidence to support the jury’s finding of damages; S&S essentially admitted that
it was obligated to return Rogers’s substantial down payment, and at trial Rogers introduced
evidence as to expenses incurred and lost earnings.
We are also unpersuaded by S&S’s arguments that a new trial is warranted.5  S&S
alleges three separate trial errors.  First, it argues that the District Court erred in taking
judicial notice of Rogers’s equitable interest in the property.  We can find no error; it is
hornbook law that a valid, enforceable contract for the purchase of land does in fact give the
purchaser an equitable interest.  See, e.g., 4 Richard R. Powell, Powell on Real Property §
37-137[1][d] (1997) (stating that the purchaser is “recognized as holding equitable (as
contrasted to legal) title to the property”).  Second, S&S complains that the jury
instructions were critically defective in failing to instruct the jury adequately with regard to
certain stipulated, judicially noticed, and otherwise settled facts.  Taken as a whole,
however, it is clear that the jury instructions “properly apprised the jury of the issues and
the applicable law.”  Hurley v. Atlantic City Police Dept., 174 F.3d 95, 115 (3d Cir. 1999)
(quoting Dressler v. Busch Entertainment Corp., 143 F.3d 778, 780 (3d Cir. 1998). 
Finally, S&S argues that the District Court erred in responding to certain questions posed
7by the jury during deliberation.  We conclude that any error was harmless as a matter of
law.  Although S&S asserts that the District Court’s response to the jury “had a direct
bearing on the critical fact issue of whether S&S Services, Inc. had sufficiently mitigated
damages,” that issue was wholly irrelevant – the jury determined that S&S was simply not
entitled to relief and thus never reached the question of S&S’s damages.
Accordingly, the orders of the District Court will be AFFIRMED.
8_________________________
TO THE CLERK OF COURT:
Please file the foregoing Not Precedential Opinion.
      /s/ Marjorie O. Rendell           
Circuit Judge
